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A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND VERBAL
INJURY. By F. T. COOPER, M. A., LL. B. Advocate.
Edinburgh: William Green & Sons. 1894. Pages, 319.
This is a Scotch book on slander and libel. The law con-
tained in it is Scotch, and almost all of the citations are from
the Scotch reports. The merit of the book is in its arrange-
ment, and the extent to which the alphabetical classification of
slanderous and libellous words and phrases is carried. All of
the various crimes of which a person may be charged are
alphabetically arranged. Various accusations of misbehavior
are treated in the same way. Under the letter "T" in one
group we find the following, "Treacherous fellow, to call a
man a: Grierson v. Havey, 43 Scot. Jur. 1go; " "Two faced
man, to call a person a, Cunningham v. Duncan, 16 R. 383."
The Scotch law seems to be painfully sensitive of personal
reputation, and, in vindicating it, goes to lengths which cannot
be justified, and which certainly are not paralleled in America
and England. Thus it is defamatory to say that a man is a
"bad lot," "contemptible," "disgraceful," "infidel," "ignorant
of religion," "insolent dogmatist," "irreligious," "a Judas,"
"Satanic agent," "scoffer at religion," "serpent." You cannot
say that your enemy is a "scamp," or a "scoundrel," or that
he has "skedaddled ;" but you may find some relief in calling
him a "puppy," for that is permitted without damages.
Public men are protected to an unusual extent. While
sarcasm and ridicule may be used in a mild way, a continued
use of these weapons in controversy is actionable. In one
case a parliamentary candidate was allowed an issue against
the proprietor of a newspaper, who likened him to a "vipers"
and a "snake in the grass ;" and another newspaper "was
punished for saying of certain public men that they "were
sturdy, bold and unblushing repudiators," that "they acted
like thimble-riggers-heads I win; tails you lose." When
contrasted with the amenities of our press in the treatment of
political opponents, these expressions seem mild, and the
severity with which they were punished suggests that Scotch
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editors have not much chance to cultivate any extensive
vituperative vocabulary.
Although Mr. Cooper's book may not be a necessity to the
American practitioner, to the student of Scotch life and
character and to the student of law in the broad sense, it is a
mine of curious and interesting information. A. B. WEIMER.
THE LAW OF VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES, MUTUAL BENEFIT
INSURANCE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE. By \VILLIAM C.
NIBLACK. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. Second Edition.
1894.
This edition is, in many respects, a great improvement on
the first, which, as the author himself confesses in the preface
to this, was necessarily imperfect, on account of its hurried
preparation. The main outlines, however, have been followed;
but they have been very much enlarged in detail, as well as
enriched by the addition of the numerous cases decided since
the first edition. These have been so abundant, as of them-
selves to authorize the publication of a new edition, even if the
work had not stood in need of improvement.
The most valuable feature of the book is its full treatment
of the principles of law governing unincorporated associations
-a subject generally either disregarded, pushed out of sight
in a corner of Insurance, or grudgingly given standing-room
under Corporations, where it does not belong. Yet the growth
of such societies has been so rapid, and some of them have
attained such numerical, social, and even political strength,
that they deserve a separate department of legal literature.
But so long as this is denied them, (Stevick on Unincor-
porated Associations, a mere essay, being the only independent
work thereon that has come to the writer's notice,) they can
nowhere be treated of so well as in a work on this subject.
Realizing that fact, the author has stated the general principles
governing their formation and management, though, in many
respects, these are but the merest incidents of the subject of
insurance.
The author's statements of the law are clear, precise and
positive,-a most excellent feature in a text-book, the proper
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province of which is to state what the law is, not what it
ought to be, which belongs to the essayist, nor why it is as it
is, which belongs to the elementary writer. His judgment,
also, on disputed points, is remarkably sound; and his rever-
ence for obiter dicta, which are generally sops to Cerberus,
less than little. In a few words, he dissipates the cloud of
uncertainty cast around the question of the binding
effect of the by-laws of an unincorporated association by the
dic/a that the courts will not interfere with their execution,
It/Iless they are vzan4fcstly harsh and unconscionable; and
declares, with convincing energy, that "while a society remains
unincorporated it may make regulations, ad libitum, for the
discipline of its members, including, of course, expulsion, so
long as they are not in conflict with the law. But the morbent
it obtains a charter it parts with the powers it before pos-
sessed, and comes under the law which governs corporate
bodies." This, of course, does not apply to an illegal or
wanton abuse of the by-laws.
Especially valuable portions of the work are, the chapter on
"Suits against Unincorporated Societies," which contains the
most complete and able discussion of that subject known to
the writer, if not the only one of any substantial value; and that
on the "Construction of the Designation of the Beneficiary,"
which is one of the most important questions in benefit insur-
ance, and one of the most disturbed by conflicting decisions.
The author's treatment of this latter is very full and satisfac-
tory ; but it may be permitted to note that he has omitted to
include the question, whether or not illegitimates, when not
expressly named, may take as " children" or "relatives." It
has been decided that they may take as "children," under a
will, in a proper case: Hill v. Crook, 6 L. R. H. L. 265;
contra, Dormin v. Dorm, 7 L. R. H. L. 568 ; but not as "rela-
tives:" In re Saville's Trusts, 14 W. R. 603; unless under
special circumstances, as in the recent case of In re Deakin,
[1894] 3 Ch. 565. By analogy, they should take as bene-
ficiaries or not, under similar circumstances. He does, how-
ever, state that an adopted child will, under some circum-
.stances, take as a "child."
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There has been added to the work a discussion of the sub-
ject cf "Accident Insurance," which the author earnestly
hopes "may not be found to be without value." He may
console himself on this score. Though brief, the chapters on
this subject contain an admirable compendium of the law
thereon, which lack of space forbids longer comment upon.
It may not be altogether idle, however, to refer to the interest-
ing discussion on the subject of "Voluntary Exposure to
Danger;" and to that on the subject of total disability,
where will be found the sound decision of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, that when a man, blind in one eye, before
taking out a policy, loses the sight of the other, it is " a loss
of the sight of both eyes," within the meaning of the policy:
Humphreys v. Assn., 139 Pa. 264. The rule, as is correctly
stated by Mr. Niblack, is, that such policies are to be liberally
construed, a rule that should be commended to the notice of
the New York court, which recently decided that the loss of
all the fingers and part of the palm, leaving only the second
joint of the thumb, was not a loss of "one entire hand,"
within the meaning of the policy: Sneck v. Travellers' Ins.
Co. of Har#ord, 3o N. Y. Suppl. 881. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, however, has since held that such a question
is for the jury alone: Lord v. American fIut. Ace. Assn., 61
N. W. Rep. 293.
The whole book bears evidence of very careful preparation;
and while, on account of its restricted scope, it cannot fairly
be compared with more comprehensive and extensive works,
it may be safely affirmed to be, within its own sphere, the
equal of any, and, in some respects, as has been said, superior
to all. ARDEMUS STEWART.
RULES OF EVIDENCE, AS PRESCRIBED BY THE CoMuIoN LAW,
FOR THE TRIAL OF ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS. By GEORGE
W. BRADNER. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1895.
Recent works on Evidence have been more distinguished
by their bulk than by any other feature. They have endeav-
ored to present the subject in all its relations, forgetting that.
it is so intimately connected with pleading that it requires very-
BOOK REVIEWS.
careful attention to keep the two separate. This is especially
true of the bulky volumes of Rice on Evidence, which really
amount to but little more than a digest of reported cases.
The older works on the subject, such as Greenleaf, have
been so patched by the necessaty addition of new matter,
often contradictory of the original text, as to be ill-adapted to
present needs and conditions ; other works, such as Stephen,
have been little more than a bald statement of rules and prin-
ciples, with too few citations to make it possible to satisfac-
torily substantiate therefrom the doctrines of the text; and
yet others, such as Wood, have aimed chiefly at furnishing a
practical statement of the rules that govern the admissibility of
evidence in a form ready for easy use. There is, therefore, still
room for a work such as this, which, while striving to present
its matter in a convenient form, also aims at giving, as far as
is possible, a logical statement of the rules of evidence, and
their underlying principles. It therefore occupies, as the
author states in his preface, a position intermediate between
Greenleaf, Taylor, and the others of that ilk, on the one
hand, and Wood, Stephen, and their congeners, on the other.
This makes it of especial value, for in its pages one may
find not only the necessary rules that govern the admissibility
of evidence, but also very many of the instances in which
those rules have been applied to special circumstances. All
obsolete law has, however, been carefully eliminated, for it was
no part of the author's purpose to give a history of the
development of the law of evidence. In fact, the citations are
almost entirely confined to the latest decided cases, especially
on controverted points.
In regard to questions still unsettled, the author has not
permitted himself the amusement of airing his knowledge in
critical dissertations. He states the rule, as he conceives it,
cites his authorities, and leaves the reader to verify his con-
clusions, if he chooses, a method that not only saves space,
but pays a delicate compliment to the sagacity of his audience.
One point that strikes the attention is, the almost entire
absence of the discussion with regard to the disqualification
*of a witness by interest, which occupies so large a portion of
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other works. This is a notable improvement. Interest, as a
disqualification, has been almost wholly wiped out in this.
country, save in the case of suits in which the estate of a
deceased person is interested, and a discussion of it is therefore
a useless encumbrance. The exception noted is, of course,
fully treated.
The underlying principle of the law of evidence is, as Mr.
BRADNER justly states, the relevancy of the evidence offered.
On this its admissibility depends. The proposition is so simple,
and so self-evident, that it is a wonder that greater stress has
not been previously laid upon it. And yet, as we all know,
Greenleaf fails to state that doctrine clearly, although he
demonstrates it plainly enough in his discussion; and others
have been equally remiss. But there are some branches of
evidence, which, though, strictly speaking, they do not belong
to evidence at all, are yet so inseparably connected with it as
to form a necessary part of any work on that subject, in spite
of the fact that relevancy cannot be properly predicated of
them. Such is the subject of judicial notice; which accord-
irgly is given place in this book, and receives a full discussion.
One of the best features of this work is its completeness in
matters of detail; which, from its size and scope, one would
hardly have expected. But some minor matters are mentioned,
that are omitted in more pretentious volumes. Such are the
statements that the courts will take judicial notice of the
enumeration of the inhabitants of a state, (thou'gh there is no
mention of the fact that the Court of NewYork, in the notorious
apportionment case, declined to accept that doctrine;) that an
attorney is compellable to disclose the name of the person who
has retained him; and that an attorney can be compelled to
disclose communications made to him by a client, conveying
information of an intent to commit fraud or crime.
On the whole the book is a valuable one not only from the
fact that it is new, and contains the latest cases, but that it
presents the law in a compact form, and one eminently con-
venient for ready reference. Q.
210
BOOK REVIEWS.
THE STATUTE RAILROAD LAWS OF NEW YORK, containing the
General Railroad Law, the General Corporation Law, the
Stock Corporation Law, the Statutory Construction Law,
the Rapid Transit Act, the Condemnation Law, &c., with
Numerous Citations, &c. By GEORGE A. BENHAM, of the
Troy Bar. Albany, N. Y.: W,. C. Little & Co. 1894.
One of the most striking evidences of the growth and
development of our country is the number of books that has
appeared of recent years, dealing with the laws peculiar to
the larger and wealthier states. In the early years of the
century, and, indeed, until a quite recent date, such works
would have gone begging for a publisher, for they could only
have commanded a very limited clientele. But now they are
a necessity, since development along different and sometimes
contradictory lines has rendered the law of one state often
wholly inapplicable to another; and the accumulated mass
renders a general work too bulky for handy reference.
In this volume, however, the author has not wholly con-
fined himself to the law of his own state; he has also in-
cluded the Interstate Commerce Act, and has referred to
numerous decisions from other states, as well as from Eng-
land, tending to explain the construction of the New -York
Statutes. This, of course, lends much additional value to the
book, and redeems it from the accusation of mere provincial-
ism, which might be successfully urged against some works
of a similar scope, notably one published some years ago,
that professed to treat of the subject of mandamus under the
laws of the same state.
In scope and execution this book proves an excellent
development of its author's idea, and compares very favorably
with other works on the same lines, such as Weimer on Rail-
roads, to quote the most recent example. Of course, its use-
fulness is limited by its scope to the state with whose laws it
deals; but to the lawyers of that state it is indispensable.
R. D. S.
THE FEDERAL INcOME TAX EXPLAINED. By JOHN M. GOULD
AND GEORGE L. TUCKER, Authors of "Notes on the United
States Statutes." Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1894.
Whatever may be the outcome of the present contest before
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the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of the new
Income Tax, this little book will be widely read. It is simply
a clear and concise account of the construction put by the
courts and by the Department of Internal Revenue upon the
various clauses of the former Acts of this character, and a well
drawn comparison between the provisions of the earlier laws
and those of the Act of 1894, which, if it withstands the
present assault upon its general constitutionality, will doubtless
prove a fruitful field for future contests in which the interpre-
tation of its separate clauses will figure.
The book is thoroughly well arranged in the form of an
annotation, the decisions upon each point of the previous Acts
being grouped under a brief statement of the point itself. The
authors have wisely abstained from entering upon any discus-
sion of the wisdom or folly, constitutionality or unconstitu-
tionality of the law. They have merely offered, in a practical
and convenient form, the data which every lawyer, in whose
hands is placed a case, under this law, will refer to. The
exhaustive index adds materially to the value of the book.
W.
LICENSE LAWS. ALL LICENSE LAWS RESTRICTING INTER-
STATE COMMERCE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Chicago: J.
A. SHEPARD, Publisher.
The defendant in the case of City of Titusville, Pennsylvania,
v.j. W. Brennan, 153 U. S. 193, was an employ6 of the pub-
lisher of this little pamphlet, which contains a history of the
case, and a copy of the decision of the court of last resort.
Accompanying it is a leaflet in which are set forth what the
author considers the steps advisable to be taken by "drum-
mers" for their protection in case they are arrested for selling
without a license when engaged in interstate commerce.
The Collector Publisher Company (Detroit) has issued two
more of the excellent quizzers, or series of questions and
answers, for students preparing for examination for admission
to the bar, etc., No. 12, on Agency, and No. 13, on Partner-
ship. Mr. Wm. C. SPRAGUE is the author and compiler of
these little books, and much credit is due his thoroughness in
covering the ground of his subjects, and the order in which he
has arranged the questions and answers. Quizzers on Black-
stone, on Domestic Relations, Criminal Law, Torts, Real
Property, Constitutional Law, Contracts, and on Negotiable
Instruments, have already made their appearance, and others
are to folicsw.
